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Silicon Valley isn’t a special place for invention and for 
startups because of special infrastructure or special laws, but 
because of special ideas and special norms.  Those norms don’t 
hold up in court, and they erode a little bit every time someone 
like [Zynga’s CEO Mark] Pincus only thinks about what they 
can get away with instead of what’s right.  This reduces the 
perceived value of equity for everyone in the valley, makes 
everyone less open, less trusting, less willing to take a risk.  In 
 
 * Thomas A. Smith, Professor of Law, University of San Diego Law 
School.  I would like to thank Amal Dorai for suggestions and comments.  
Special thanks for research assistance to Allison Kuhns.  For LWJ.  Copyright © 
2012 Thomas A. Smith. 
SMITH FINAL 7/23/2013  9:26 PM 
578 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
 
the end, we all lose for that. 
If I had my way, Pincus would never work in this town 
again.  Anyone involved in this decision should be made a 
pariah.  If we don’t defend the norms that make innovation 
possible, we’ll lose them. 
—Lambent_Cactus at Hacker News1 
INTRODUCTION 
Mark Pincus, Chief Executive of Zynga, Inc., did not offer 
big salaries to the talent he recruited to his popular online 
gaming company when it was just starting up, but he did give 
out a lot of stock options.2  For many early employees, this 
turned out to be a great deal.  Zynga went public in December 
2011,3 and is now a multibillion-dollar company.4  For other 
employees, the deal was less favorable.  As Zynga prepared to 
go public, Pincus and other top executives decided some 
Zynga employees had gotten too many stock options.  So 
Pincus took the controversial step of demanding that these 
purportedly over-valued employees give back some of their 
options to the company or else be fired and lose all of their 
options that had not already vested.5  I call this the Zynga 
clawback.  According to the Wall Street Journal, Zynga 
executives said “they didn’t want a ‘Google chef’ situation.”6 
 
 1. Lambent_Cactus, Comment to Zynga Chief Seeks to Claw Back Stock, 
HACKER NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3218997. 
 2. Justin Scheck & Shayndi Raice, Zynga Leans on Some Workers to 
Surrender Pre-IPO Shares, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020462190457701837322348080
2.html.  
 3. Evelyn M. Rusli, For Zynga’s I.P.O., Pomp and a Slump, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 2011, at B3. 
 4. Id. 
  5. Scheck & Raice, supra note 2. 
 6. Id. (explaining that shortly before the company’s IPO, Zynga CEO 
Pincus pressured employees to surrender stock options); see also Rebecca 
Greenfield, Zynga Defends Its Scandalous Options System, ATLANTIC WIRE 
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/business/2011/11/zynga-
defends-its-scandalous-options-system/44839/ (stating that Pincus defends 
controversial decision as a “meritocracy”); Gary Rivlin, Zynga’s IPO Gives 
Founder Mark Pincus a Stock Class All His Own, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 14, 2011), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/14/zynga-s-ipo-gives-founder-
mark-pincus-a-stock-class-all-his-own.html (“[Pincus will] have 70 votes for 
every supershare of Zynga he owns. . . .  [T]he roughly 100 million shares . . . 
offered to the masses . . . [will] provide a mere one vote per share.”); Evelyn M. 
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The Zynga executives were referring to Charlie Ayers, a 
chef who went to work for Google in its early days and was 
paid partly in stock options.7  These options were reported 
ultimately to be worth around $26 million after Google went 
public.8  To Zynga executives, the term Google chef was a 
rebus for an employee who was granted a quantity of stock 
options that turned out to be worth far more than the 
employee was worth to the company.  The food at Google may 
have been good, but for his six years of work, Google paid 
Ayers more than $4 million per year9—surely far too much. 
Or was it?  When Ayers agreed to work for cash and stock 
options, he presumably contemplated the possibility that they 
might someday be worth a lot of money, perhaps even as 
much as $26 million.  Had Google come back to him when it 
appeared they might be worth a princely sum and demanded 
some of them back, Ayers might reasonably have accused 
them of acting opportunistically.  If a homeowner were to pay 
a painter for painting his house with lottery tickets that had 
a modest expected value, any first year law student should be 
able to tell you that the homeowner should not be able to get 
the lottery tickets back if they later turned out to be worth 
millions.  The homeowner took that risk when he decided to 
pay in lottery tickets.  Buyer’s remorse is not grounds for 
overturning a contract.10  Is the Zynga situation any 
different?  Is Pincus one of those (near) billionaires who think 
the rules don’t apply to them? 
 
Rusli, Zynga: Bully or Meritocracy?, NYTIMES.COM DEALBOOK (Nov. 10, 2011, 
6:23 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/zynga-bully-or-meritocracy/ 
(reporting that Twitter’s masses condemned Pincus’s behavior as “despicable,” 
“foolish,” and even “evil” after the Wall Street Journal’s article accused him of 
clawing back employee shares); Richard Waters, Zynga Rethinks Silicon Valley 
Pay Structures, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011, 12:17 AM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5997a58a-0bf5-11e1-931000144feabdc0.html# 
axzz20hR78NTg (noting that Zynga has asked some executives to hand back 
their unvested stock as a condition of remaining at the company). 
 7. See STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND 
SHAPES OUR LIVES 133 (2011).  See generally Adam Lusher, Chef Lifts Lid on 
Google’s Recipe for Success, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 23, 2008, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582494/Chef-lifts-lid-on-Googles-
recipe-for-success.html. 
 8. See Lusher, supra note 7. 
  9. See generally id.  
 10. See generally 30 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:10 
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2012).  
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 Actually, the Zynga clawback is different.  Under the 
laws of California,11 Zynga was within its rights to demand 
that (in its view) underperforming employees either give back 
some of their unvested stock options or be fired.  The reason 
for this is that employees of technology startups in Silicon 
Valley and in other entrepreneurial hubs, who are neither 
founders nor C-level executives, are almost always employees 
at will.12  Under the at-will doctrine, an employer may 
terminate an employee at any time, for any reason or for no 
reason.13  Employees are also free to quit at any time, for any 
reason or no reason.14  Precedents in California and 
Delaware, as well as other states, make it reasonably clear 
that it is permissible under the at-will employment doctrine 
to fire an employee because she became too expensive given 
the terms of her stock option plan.15  Companies may fire at- 
will employees for any reason, and being overcompensated is 
as good as any other reason or no reason. 
 
 11. Zynga is incorporated in Delaware but was probably a quasi-foreign 
California corporation before its IPO.  See generally CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 
(2010).  According to this section, foreign corporations not traded on a national 
exchange or NASDAQ, more than fifty percent of whose shares are held by 
California residents and more than fifty percent of the average of whose 
property, payroll, and sales is allocable to California, must comply with certain 
requirements of California corporate law.  See id.; see also Wilson v. La.-Pac. 
Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852, 854–63 (Ct. App. 1982); W. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Sobieski, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727–29 (Ct. App. 1961) (finding that regulations of 
the Commissioner of Corporations regarding quasi-foreign corporations are 
consistent with the internal affairs doctrine).  See generally Stephen R. Ginger, 
Regulation of Quasi-Foreign Corporations in California: Reflections on Section 
2115 After Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 14 SW. U. L. REV. 665, 
667, 671–83 (1984). 
 12. ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET, at xvi–xvii, 93–94 (2003). 
 13. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (2012) (“An employment, having no specified 
term, may be terminated at the will of either party . . . .”); Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, 
Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1100 & n.8 (Cal. 2000) (explaining that at-will employment 
may be terminated at any time, with or without cause, for any lawful reason or 
no reason at all, assuming that there was no violation of public policy involved); 
Scott v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 904 P.2d 834, 839–840 (Cal. 1995) (explaining the 
strong Common Law presumption that an employee may be terminated at will); 
Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455, 471 (Ct. App. 
2010) (explaining that at-will employment relationships may be terminated for 
any lawful reason, or no reason at all). 
 14. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (2012). 
 15. Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 21st Century: A 
Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 719 (2006). 
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Even if a good reason were required, firing an employee 
because she costs shareholders more in dilution than she 
added to the value of the corporation through her work might 
satisfy such a test.  One could argue that a chief executive 
such as Zynga’s Pincus had a duty to his company’s 
shareholders, albeit one it would be impractical to enforce 
judicially,16 to shed employees who took more value out of the 
company in equity claims than they put in through labor.  If a 
company could legally cast such an employee over the side, 
then over the side she should presumably go, if we suppose 
the job of management is to maximize the value of the 
company to its shareholders.17 
Zynga clawbacks may be legal, but are they a good idea?  
The answer, legally speaking, is not necessarily.  The Wall 
Street Journal worries that “[if] Zynga’s demand for the 
return of shares . . . were . . . to catch on and spread, [it] 
would erode a central pillar of Silicon Valley culture.”18  This 
anxiety is justified.  A central pillar of Silicon Valley business 
culture, as the Wall Street Journal notes, is that “start-ups 
with limited cash and a risk of failure dangle the possibility of 
stock riches in order to lure talent.”19  The furor caused by the 
Zynga clawback suggests that many Silicon Valley employees 
did not realize that clawbacks were possible.20  Perhaps they 
naively thought simply that if the startup they joined became 
improbably successful, they would become improbably rich. 
 
 
 16. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention 
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 passim (2004).  
 17. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986) (“[F]rom the 
traditional legal viewpoint, a corporation’s directors and officers have a 
fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth, subject to numerous duties to 
meet specific obligations to other groups affected by the corporation.”).  See 
generally Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A 
Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 230 
(1999). 
 18. Scheck & Raice, supra note 2. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., Jungle Joe, Comment to Evaluating Stock Offer as Part of 
Compensation, ARS TECHNICA (Jun. 1, 2012, 6:25 AM) (“What is an ‘option 
clawback’?”); see also Semil Shah, Clawbacks and Startups Don’t Mix, 
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 10, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/11/10/clawbacks-
startups/ (stating that “[s]tartups are supposed to be different” from other 
businesses, like hedge funds, where employers are fired on a whim). 
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The Wall Street Journal is correct to worry about Zynga 
clawbacks.  If they become standard, they could chill the 
entrepreneurial ardor of potential startup employees.21  
Zynga clawbacks have a perverse logic.  The more successful 
a startup company is, the more its stock options will be worth.  
The more they are worth, the more likely it is that the 
company will regret having given so many of them to its 
employees.  Thus the more successful a company is, the more 
likely it is, other things equal, that it will want to claw back 
some of the options it has issued to employees.22  Smart 
potential startup employees will foresee this possibility and 
their incentives to work for stock options will be reduced. 
Yet from management’s point of view, clawbacks are not 
necessarily opportunistic at all.  Journalistic accounts of 
Pincus’s behavior at Zynga are at least consistent with the 
account that he sincerely believed that the employees from 
whom he wanted options back were not living up to 
reasonable expectations.  It might have been the employees, 
not Pincus and his company, who were behaving 
opportunistically.  One function of at-will doctrine is to reduce 
opportunism by employees.  An employer that hires an 
employee not at-will but for a term can fire the employee only 
for a good cause, which is notoriously difficult for employers 
 
 21. One commenter on Hacker News, the popular social news website about 
computer hacking and startup companies, exclaimed: 
Wow this should be straight up illegal and yet:  
“One lawyer said that over the past year, he has heard executives of 
three social-media sites discuss the possibility of clawing back equity 
from some employees.  Another lawyer, who has handled stock-
compensation issues with technology companies for decades, said he 
never saw a company try to take equity from employees until about two 
years ago, but has since seen three such cases at start-ups.”  
I don’t see how this is anything other than theft.  They’re saying that 
either you give us some of your compensation back (you may not have 
joined if it were not for those stock options/grants) or you’re fired and 
lose it all.  Insane. 
smokinn, Comment to Zynga Chief Seeks to Claw Back Stock, HACKER NEWS 
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3218880.  Another 
commenter opined: “This is bad for the start-up community.  There isn’t much 
reason for a great hacker to join start-up if he/she thinks you might want to 
play ‘take-backs’ if the company succeeds.”  DevX101, Comment to Zynga Chief 
Seeks to Claw Back Stock, Hacker News (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3218884. 
 22. See Scheck & Raice, supra note 2. 
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to establish.23  Employees who can be fired only for cause can 
perform perfunctorily,24 just above the standard that would 
get them fired, and still collect the compensation due under 
the employment contract.  Startups hire at will partly to 
reduce this shirking behavior.  Renegotiating an employment 
contract with an underperforming employee for fewer stock 
options in the shadow of an at-will termination might merely 
be an instance of using the at-will doctrine exactly as it 
should be used. 
As this Article will show, hiring startup workers as at- 
will employees and compensating them partly with stock 
options is economically complex.  It is a business practice that 
has evolved over time and serves several important functions.  
Under existing law, Pincus and Zynga could indeed legally 
claw back options.  Yet their ability to do so is worrisome and 
highlights a way in which existing startup employment 
practice could be improved, at least in some cases.  After 
discussing the purposes served by the current practice, this 
Article will consider an alternative contractual arrangement 
that prospective startup employees could negotiate for that 
would restrict clawbacks and make the work-compensation 
exchange more efficient. 
I. THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AND STOCK OPTION 
PLANS 
A modern stock option plan has a fairly straightforward 
contract at its core, though with all its details of 
implementation, it is a fearsomely complicated legal beast.25  
The complexity results mostly from having to comply with 
complex tax and securities laws,26 but it is the basic structure 
of the core contract that allows Zynga clawbacks to occur. 
 
 
 23. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Employment-at-Will—Is the Model Act the 
Answer?, 23 STETSON L. REV. 179, 189 (1993). 
 24. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J. 
ECON. 1, 6 (2008). 
 25. E.g., Zynga Inc., 2007 Equity Incentive Plan Stock Option Agreement 
[hereinafter 2007 Zynga Plan], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/1439404/000119312511315435/d198836dex103.htm. 
 26. See, e.g., How to Handle Employee Stock Options, CNNMONEY, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/money101/lesson10/index.htm (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
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The arrangement between a startup such as Zynga and a 
nonfounder employee is best thought of as having two parts.  
The first part is the employment agreement itself.  For most 
of the talent that a startup hires, the employment 
relationship is at will.27  The at-will employment relationship 
allows either the hiring company or the employee to 
terminate the relationship at any time, whether for a good 
cause, a bad cause, or no cause at all.28  Professors of 
employment law have harshly criticized this doctrine, but 
American courts still enforce it.29  The second part of the 
startup-employee relationship is the stock option plan itself. 
Ideally, soon after it is founded, or at least before it starts 
to grant stock options, a startup will establish a stock option 
plan.  This plan is the overall structure that sets forth the 
specific terms of the stock options that the company will 
grant to some of its employees.30  Part of this arrangement 
will be a stock option agreement, which is the contract 
between a particular employee and the company that grants 
the options, subject to the terms of the stock option plan.31  
The stock option agreement is styled as a grant of options to 
the employee, but the options are nothing like gifts or 
gratuities.  Instead, courts generally recognize that the 
options are granted in exchange for the employee working for 
 
 27. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology 
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 590 (1999) (highlighting that Silicon Valley engineers 
shifted between firms so frequently that it became the norm, indicating an at- 
will relationship between the employees and employers). 
 28. See generally Maureen S. Binetti et al., The Employment-At-Will 
Doctrine: Have Its Exceptions Swallowed the Rule?  Common Law Limitations 
upon an Employer’s Control over Employees-At-Will, in 1 HANDLING WRONGFUL 
TERMINATION CLAIMS 2001, at 577, 587 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course 
Handbook Series No. 650, 2001); Julia Barnhart, Comment, The Implied-In-
Fact Contract Exception to At-Will Employment: A Call for Reform, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 817 (1998); Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisiting the At-Will Employment 
Doctrine: Imposed Terms, Implied Terms, and the Normative World of the 
Workplace, 36 INDUS. L.J. 84 (2007). 
 29. For a good summary of the status of the at-will employment doctrine in 
the United States, see Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the 
Gap Between At-Will Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 66–70 
(2008). 
 30. Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock 
Options and Rule 10B-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 546 (2003). 
 31. See id. 
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the company—that is, the employee working for the company 
serves as consideration for the stock option agreement.32  
Because the stock option agreement is supported by 
consideration, it is legally enforceable, and efforts to attack 
these agreements as lacking consideration typically have 
failed.33 
The 2007 Zynga Equity Incentive Plan recites a purpose 
that is typical for stock option plans.34  The purpose of the 
plan, it says, is: 
[T]o provide incentives to attract, retain and motivate 
eligible persons whose present and potential contributions 
are important to the success of the Company, its Parent 
and Subsidiaries by offering eligible persons an 
opportunity to participate in the Company’s future 
performance through awards of Options, Restricted Stock, 
and Restricted Stock Units.35 
To accomplish this, the overall structure of the plan is that of 
a unilateral contract.36  The plan offers the award of stock 
options to the employee in return for her continuing to work 
for the company, which is her acceptance of the offer.  Put 
another way, the performance invited and induced by this 
offer is the forbearance by the employee from exercising the 
right she has as an at-will employee to terminate the 
employment relationship at any time for any reason.  This 
unilateral structure means that the contract is formed 
continuously, as it were, as the employee continues working 
for the company. 
 
 32. Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. Ch. 1952). 
 33. E.g., Church v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., No. 3:05CV422, 2008 WL 5429604, 
at *14 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 30, 2008); Coelho v. Posi-Seal Int’l, Inc., 544 A.2d 170, 
176 (Conn. 1988); Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 194 P.3d 96, 105 (Nev. 
2008). 
 34. Bodie, supra note 30, at 548. 
 35. Zynga Game Network Inc., 2007 Equity Incentive Plan § 1, available at 
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1439404/000119312511190294/dex102.htm. 
 36. See Chinn v. China Nat’l Aviation Corp., 291 P.2d 91, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1955) (“Of late years the attitude of the courts (as well as of employers in 
general) is to consider regulations of this type which offer additional advantages 
to employees as being in effect offers of a unilateral contract which offer is 
accepted if the employee continues in the employment, and not as being mere 
offers of gifts.”); see also Newberger v. Rifkind, 104 Cal. Rptr. 663, 667 (Ct. App. 
1972) (discussing an implied unilateral contract for stock option agreement); 
Hunter v. Sparling, 197 P.2d 807, 813–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (inferring an 
enforceable promise to pay pension benefits from employer’s personnel policies). 
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The plan creates the incentive for the employee to keep 
working for the company through an option-vesting 
schedule.37  The option-vesting schedule is the timetable by 
which the employee may actually exercise her stock options to 
buy company stock.  When the company first grants the 
employee options, they are typically not exercisable 
immediately to buy stock.  First they have to vest.38  Under 
the Zynga 2007 Equity Incentive Plan, which is typical of 
Silicon Valley plans in this respect,39 twenty-five percent of 
the total option grant vests (the vesting cliff) one year after 
the vesting clock starts running on the day the employee is 
hired, which is when the options are granted.40  The 
remaining seventy-five percent vests in thirty-six equal parts 
each month over the succeeding three years.41  Thus if the 
employee quits within one year of the day she is hired (and 
the day she gets her option grant), she loses the right to buy 
any stock.  She has to work for the company for a full year to 
be able to exercise twenty-five percent of her options, and for 
four years to be able to exercise all of the options the company 
granted her when she was hired.42  In this way, the vesting 
schedule likely gives the employee an incentive to continue 
working for the company, at least for four years.  The longer 
she stays at the company, up to four years, the more of her 
options she will be able to exercise to buy company stock. 
Well-drafted stock option plans are careful to provide 
that nothing about the stock option arrangement changes the 
at-will relationship between the employee and the company.  
 
 37. 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25, § 2.1. 
 38. See id. (indicating that the vesting start date will be set forth in the 
agreement). 
 39. See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S 
GUIDE TO BUSINESS LAW 99 (4th ed. 2012). 
 40. See id.  In order to insure compliance with section 409A of the Internal 
Revenue Code, the best conservative practice is actually for the Board to grant 
options to all employees who have started with the Company since the last 
board meeting, instead of authorizing the CEO to make new-hire grants on the 
date of hire, which was the traditional practice.  Vesting can still begin on the 
hire date if the conservative practice is followed.  Patrick J. Rondeau & 
Kimberly B. Wethly, Best Practices for Option Grants by Venture-Backed 
Companies, in ADVANCED VENTURE CAPITAL 2008, at 45, 48 (PLI Corp. Law & 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 1666, 2008). 
 41. See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 39, at 99. 
 42. Id.  
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The 2007 Zynga Plan, under which the clawed back options 
were issued, is no exception.  “Nothing in the Plan or this 
Agreement” it states, “shall confer on Participant any right to 
continue in the employ of, or other relationship with, the 
Company . . . or limit in any way the right of the Company . . . 
to terminate Participant’s employment or other relationship 
at any time, with or without Cause.”43  This critical term 
made the Zynga clawback legally possible.  Nothing in the 
stock option plan changes the fact that the company and the 
employee have an at-will relationship with each other.  The 
company can still terminate the employee for good cause, bad 
cause, or no cause.  That is reportedly what Zynga threatened 
to do to some employees if they did not give back some of their 
options to the company.44 
The mechanics of how termination affects options under 
a stock option plan are worth reviewing.  The 2007 Zygna 
Plan divides terminations into three classes: termination 
because of death or disability, termination for cause, and 
termination for any other reason.45  In the last case, a not-for-
cause termination, the terminated employee would 
apparently be able to exercise as many of her options as had 
already vested by her termination date, as long as she did so 
before three months after her termination or the expiration 
date of the options, whichever was earlier.46  The impact of a 
for-cause termination appears to be harsher than without-
cause termination for the employee.  The Zynga agreement 
states that “[i]f the Participant is terminated for Cause, 
Participant’s Options expire immediately upon such 
Termination.”47  This must mean at a minimum that the 
employee’s unvested options expire immediately and so 
cannot ever be exercised.  The agreement is somewhat murky 
as to what is to become of vested but unexercised options, but 
they are probably meant to expire as well.  Options do not 
exercise themselves.  An employee ordinarily must present an 
 
 43. 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25, § 3.4. 
 44. Scheck & Raice, supra note 2.  
 45. 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25, §§ 3.1–3.3. 
 46. In another example of poor draftsmanship, the expiration date is defined 
as being limited, inter alia, by section 5.6 of the Agreement, when the 
agreement has no section 5.6.  See 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25. 
 47. 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25. § 3.3. 
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executed form to the company, along with a check or other 
permitted form of payment for the exercise price, in order to 
exercise vested options.48  Thus, a terminated employee might 
have vested options but not yet have exercised them.  
Conventional investing wisdom is that, consistent with option 
pricing theory, employees should hold options as long as 
possible before exercising them.49  The Zynga agreement, 
though not clearly drafted, then, appears to have the harsh 
result of punishing employees for following conventional 
investment strategies by terminating both unvested and 
vested but unexercised options the terminated employee may 
have.  In other words, Zynga employees terminated without 
cause would lose all of their unvested options, and Zynga 
employees terminated with cause would lose all of their 
unvested options, and possibly all of the unexercised options 
(whether vested or not). 
The two parts of the employment arrangement between 
the startup company and the employee, the at-will 
relationship and the stock options, thus work together.  The 
employment relationship itself is at will.  One may call this 
relationship a contract, but if it is, it’s an illusory one because 
neither the employee nor the employer is under any 
obligation to continue the relationship.50  The stock option 
plan, on the other hand, is part of a bona fide unilateral 
contract.51  It is a standing offer that the company will 
recognize the options as vesting according to the schedule and 
will be obliged to issue stock upon the exercise of the vested 
options as long as the employee continues to work for the 
employer and fulfills any other obligations that may be in the 
plan (such as a nondisclosure covenant, for example).  The 
employee’s continued work at the company is the acceptance 
 
 48. Id. at §§ 4.1, 4.3. 
 49. See How to Handle Employee Stock Options, supra note 26. 
 50. Lord, supra note 15, at 714–15. 
 51. California law provides that “[i]n cases involving employee benefits, 
such as pension plans and stock options, the rule has developed that the offer of 
such bonuses constitutes an offer for a unilateral contract, which is accepted if 
the employee continues in employment after the offer.” DiGiacinto v. Ameriko–
Omserv Corp., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 300, 303 (Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added). 
“ ‘ Consideration is inherent where stock options are granted to employees and 
the employee continues employment knowing of the options . . . .’ ”   Id. at 303–
04 (quoting Newberger v. Rifkind, 104 Cal. Rptr. 663, 665 (Ct. App. 1972)). 
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by performance of the unilateral contract offer made to the 
employee by company in its stock option plan.52 
The company’s obligation to perform arises only if the 
employee actually remains in the employ of the company for 
the time periods contemplated by the vesting schedule.53  If 
the company terminates the employee, options that have not 
yet vested will not vest because the employee will not be 
performing in the manner required by the stock option plan 
offer.  Perhaps counter-intuitively to the nonlawyer, it does 
not matter that the employee is not working for the company 
because the company terminated her.  The stock option plan 
makes this clear, providing for it expressly.54  If an employee 
no longer works for the company, regardless of the reason, 
her options that have not already vested will not do so and 
her vested, unexercised options may even expire immediately 
if the company terminates her for cause.  It is this 
consequence of termination that allows the company to 
bargain with an employee by making the following threat: 
either give back some of your unvested options or we will take 
all of them back by terminating you. 
The peculiar pairing of an illusory, at-will contract and a 
unilateral stock option plan contract may seem odd.  Why do 
startup firms structure most of their employment 
relationships in this way?  The basic economics of contract 
theory sheds light on this question.  This structure creates 
some problems, but it is far from irrational. 
II. AGENCY THEORY AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRM 
Startups face the usual agency problems that other firms 
face, but often in aggravated form.  Startups must select 
employees suited to the particular challenges of 
entrepreneurial firms, which means choosing employees who 
are willing and able to be entrepreneurial themselves.  
Startup compensation, with its emphasis on risky stock 
options, helps address agency problems, but also brings with 
it problems of its own.55  Highly risky and potentially 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. See 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25, § 2. 
 54. Id. at §§ 3.1–3.3. 
 55. Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 42 UCLA L. 
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remunerative options present special opportunities and risks 
to both employees and firms.56  This section discusses 
startups and stock option compensation from the perspective 
of agency theory and incomplete contracts theory and then 
discusses some interesting and potentially problematic 
features of option packages that can turn out to be extremely 
valuable. 
A. Agency Theory 
One approach economists and economics-oriented legal 
scholars have taken to explain employment relationships is 
agency theory.57  From this perspective, standard employment 
contracts address fundamental agency problems that arise in 
employment relationships.58  The startup hiring an employee 
faces the same agency cost problems as do other firms, 
sometimes arguably in aggravated form.  These problems are 
traditionally divided into two categories: moral hazards and 
adverse selection problems.59  Adverse selection is closely 
related to moral hazard.  An example of the latter is the 
problem that the absence of sufficient monitoring may 
actually induce the employee shirking behavior the firm 
hopes to avoid, while an example of the former is that persons 
inclined to shirk will seek out a job where their performance 
will be difficult to monitor.60 
 
REV. 1737, 1750–51 (1994). 
 56. See Scheck & Raice, supra note 2. 
 57. The classic article in the legal literature is Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. 
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981), and the 
most cited is probably Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976).  For formal treatments, see Bengt Holmstrom, The 
Firm as a Subeconomy, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 75–76 (1999); Bengt 
Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, The Firm as an Incentive System, 84 AM. ECON. 
REV. 972 (1994); Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent 
Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 24 (1991); Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, Transfer Pricing and 
Organizational Form, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 201 (1991).  For a nice summary of 
the theoretical and an interesting survey of the empirical literature, see D. 
Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1, 29 (2009). 
 58. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 57, at 1090.  
 59.  See Smith & King, supra note 57, at 13–14. 
 60. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).  Adverse 
SMITH FINAL 7/23/2013  9:26 PM 
2013] THE ZYNGA CLAWBACK 591 
 
1. The Moral Hazard Problem 
Moral hazard arises from the misalignment of employer 
and employee incentives.61  An assembly line worker is hired 
to do work that is boring and unpleasant, and the worker will 
do as little as he must to get paid a contractually agreed 
amount.62  To her employer, labor is a costly, productive 
factor.  The firm will pay as little for labor as it can given 
market conditions and wants to get as much work as possible 
for each dollar of wages paid.63  The incentives of employer 
and employee are thus significantly, though not entirely, 
opposed. 
The employer must engage in costly monitoring to 
incentivize performance on the labor contract and this 
monitoring is unlikely to eliminate shirking entirely.  The 
costliness or impossibility of monitoring employee 
productivity incentivizes overselling by employees (whether 
deliberate or inadvertent) during the hiring process and 
shirking afterwards.64 
Startups may face these common problems in aggravated 
form.  More established companies have defined roles and 
established routines for employees to follow and to measure 
employee performance.65  An established firm might want an 
employee to perform certain coding functions or to operate a 
particular machine, for example.  Startups on the other hand 
are typically searching for early employees who not only have 
 
selection, as Smith and King usefully put it, is often seen as an information 
problem, while moral hazard is often seen as an incentive problem.  Smith & 
King, supra note 57, at 14.  Adverse selection is best dealt with through ex ante 
measures and moral hazard through ex post incentive alignment.  Id.  In fact, 
both are both information and incentive problems, but some are better 
addressed ex ante and some ex post. 
 61. See James A. Mirrlees, The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable 
Behaviour: Part I, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 3 (1999); see also Bengt Holmstrom, 
Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECONOMICS 74 (1979). 
 62. See generally Mirrlees, supra note 61, at 3. 
 63. Michael Z. Green, Unpaid Furloughs and Four Day Workweeks: 
Employer Sympathy or a Call to Action, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1139, 1166 (2010). 
 64. Note, Employer Opportunism and the Need for a Just Cause Standard, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 510, 518–19 (1989). 
 65. See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 316 (1998) (discussing the vertical structure used to 
prevent shirking where a board of directors monitors managers and managers 
monitor employees). 
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particular technical skills, but also have the ability to solve 
creatively the sort of difficult-to-anticipate problems new 
businesses regularly encounter.66  The contributions that a 
particular employee makes to the firm are usually not easily 
measurable.  The company will pay the employee under the 
employment contract, however, even if she contributes less to 
the firm than it anticipated, because her underperformance 
will not be known. 
In order to help align the incentives of employees with 
those of the startup, startups grant employees stock options.67  
Stock options will become valuable (perhaps very valuable) if 
the startup reaches a liquidity event, normally an initial 
public offering (IPO) or a sale of the startup to an established 
company (buyout).68  If stock options work as intended, the 
startup employee will do everything within her power to help 
the startup reach the liquidity event because that is what will 
make her stock options valuable, just as it will the stock of 
founders and investors, who control the firm.  The incentives 
of employees, founders, and investors are thus brought more 
into alignment with one another. 
Stock options do not work perfectly for this purpose.  
Even in a small startup with only a few dozen or hundred 
employees, a particular employee may realize that her 
individual efforts are unlikely to have a material effect on 
whether the firm succeeds in attaining a liquidity event.  The 
liquidity event is a binary occurrence—it happens or it does 
not.69  An employee’s efforts beyond what is necessary to get 
the firm to the event are wasted if she considers the matter 
self-interestedly.  If other workers are doing their jobs, a 
given worker’s marginal contribution toward getting to the 
liquidity event may be nominal.  If this is the case, the 
perfunctory employee will work hard enough to avoid 
termination under the at-will doctrine, but no harder. 
 
 
 66. Margaret Heffernan, 4 Characteristics of the Ultimate Start-Up Hire, 
INC.COM (Feb. 7, 2013), www.inc.com/margaret-heffernan/ultimate-startup-hire-
characteristics.html. 
 67. Bankman, supra note 55, at 1750. 
 68. See Scheck & Raice, supra note 2. 
 69. See Rachel S. Tennis & Alexander Baier Schwab, Business Model 
Innovation and Antitrust Law, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 307, 330 (2012). 
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From the firm’s point of view, stock options granted to an 
employee in this position are wasted since this employee’s 
efforts, beyond those required to avoid termination, are by 
hypothesis not necessary to reach a liquidity event.70  This 
employee need not be incentivized by stock options in order 
for the firm to get to the liquidity event.  Indeed, as the 
startup history unfolds, the particular employee may discover 
that she is not so incentivized once she realizes that her 
efforts are not that important to the company and, 
accordingly, reduces her efforts to the perfunctory level.  After 
all, she would get the benefit of the liquidity event whether 
she performs perfunctorily or consummately, and if a 
liquidity event never occurs, she has not wasted her efforts.  
Monitoring by the firm may or may not discover what the 
employee is doing, but if the firm does discover it, it will want 
to renegotiate the employee’s compensation.71  Zynga 
clawbacks address this situation.72 
If the firm could not renegotiate the compensation 
arrangement, the firm would be faced with two options: either 
it could terminate the perfunctorily performing employee and 
avoid the dilution from her stock options vesting, or it could 
refrain from terminating her and allow her stock options to 
vest.  If renegotiation were possible, the firm would have a 
third option—not terminating the employee, but reducing or 
eliminating her stock option participation and its consequent 
dilution.  Suppose the startup firm’s preference ordering is 
 
Renegotiate > Terminate > Maintain 
 
where Renegotiate means renegotiating the stock option plan 
with the employee so that she gets fewer stock options going 
forward, or even perhaps also sells back some of her already 
vested options to the company, but is not terminated; where 
Terminate means terminating the employee under the at-will 
doctrine, causing all of her unvested options to disappear; and 
where Maintain means simply allowing the employee to 
remain in her current arrangement, under which her stock 
 
 70. Scheck & Raice, supra note 2 
 71. Id.  
 72. See id. 
SMITH FINAL 7/23/2013  9:26 PM 
594 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
 
options will continue to vest over time.  Suppose, on the other 
hand, the employee’s preference ordering is 
 
Maintain > Renegotiate > Terminate. 
 
We may view the employer and employee as playing a 
simple two-move game in which the employer moves first, 
offering Renegotiate to the employee.  The employee may 
accept the offer and continue to work on the new terms, or 
reject it and be terminated.  Assuming the firm can credibly 
signal that it prefers Terminate over Maintain, the rational 
employee will accept renegotiation since she prefers that to 
termination (as does her employer).  If the legal rule 
prohibited this renegotiation, the firm would simply 
terminate the employee, since it prefers Terminate to 
Maintain.  Thus, a Zygna clawback may be seen as reaching a 
Pareto-superior outcome that could not be reached if 
renegotiations were prohibited.  It allows the firm to address 
the employee moral hazard problem ex post.73 
2. Adverse Selection 
The startup firm also faces an adverse selection problem 
in choosing employees.74  Prospective employees may realize 
that their performance will be hard to monitor in the startup 
firm.  Routines will be fluid, the workplace atmosphere 
informal, and much business done on a sort of honor system.75  
The startup wants to attract a particular sort of 
 
 73. Some in the industry press saw the Zynga clawback in this light.  See, 
e.g., Mike Masnick, The Real ‘Scandal’ Over Zynga Stock Options Is Over 
Misleading Reporting, TECHDIRT (Nov. 18, 2011, 4:11 PM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111118/04025616813/real-scandal-over-
zynga-stock-options-is-over-misleading-reporting.shtml. 
What Zynga did here was take a few employees that it felt weren’t 
achieving up to expectations and, rather just fire them—in which case 
they would have received none of their unvested options—try to find 
another role for them in the company.  That other role, however, would 
be somewhat lower on the totem pole, and thus, would be entitled to 
fewer stock options.  Yes, it’s basically a demotion, but for some people 
perhaps that’s preferable to an outright firing. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 74. See Smith & King, supra note 57, at 14, for an overview of the adverse 
selection problem. 
 75. Heffernan, supra note 66. 
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entrepreneurial employee, which I discuss in more detail in 
Part III.A below.  But just as in biological systems where 
parasites can sometimes invade a host by disguising 
themselves as something other than what they really are, free 
riders may present themselves as entrepreneurial employees 
when they are really just looking for a setting in which their 
underperformance will not be readily detected.76 
Stock options not only incentivize performance but also 
help identify the sort of employees the startup most wants to 
hire.77  The willingness of a startup employee to accept stock 
options in lieu of greater cash compensation sends a powerful 
signal to the employer that the prospective employee shares 
the founders’ entrepreneurial perception regarding the 
startup’s significant opportunity for success, and that the 
candidate is willing to join her economic fate to that of the 
new company.  In this way, startups can efficiently exploit 
their resources by paying stock options to those prospective 
employees who value them most.  This high valuation is also 
a serviceable proxy for an employee’s commitment and 
enthusiasm for the startup project—traits startups value 
highly in employees.78  Thus, offering stock options conserves 
cash at the same time that it selects those employees who put 
the highest value on the potential of the company. 
In the best case, acceptance of startup options rather 
than cash operates as a kind of specialized test to screen for 
entrepreneurial acumen among prospective employees.  A 
new business faces many challenges that require a special 
sort of judgment to overcome.  A person may be more likely to 
have this sort of judgment if she can see that the stock 
options make a particular startup a better job opportunity 
than another firm that pays more. 
 
 
 76. This is an instance of adverse selection by bad workers.  See J. Hoult 
Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: 
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 902–05. 
 77. Richard A. Booth, Give me Equity or Give Me Death - The Role of 
Competition and Compensation in Silicon Valley, 1 Entrepreneurial Bus. L. J. 
265, 275–76 (2007).  
 78. Id. at 275. 
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B. Incomplete Contract Theory 
The employer’s power to renegotiate the employment 
contract also gives the employer the ability to behave 
opportunistically.79  At the heart of this problem is the 
costliness of objectively measuring the value of the 
contribution a particular employee makes to the firm.  This 
measurement difficulty opens the door to both employee and 
employer opportunism.80  It makes all but extreme shirking 
by the employee difficult to catch while it is going on and 
perhaps even afterwards.  But it also makes it difficult to 
disprove false accusations by the employer of employee 
shirking.  The absence of objective measures of employee 
performance is a large part of what makes at-will 
employment the default arrangement, but also what opens 
the door to opportunism.81 
This measurement difficulty also helps explain the 
boundaries of the firm, a traditional preoccupation of 
theorists of the firm since Coase.82  Where milestones are 
readily identifiable, the startup will often hire independent 
contractors to do a job.83  Independent contractors can be 
awarded cash and stock options in exchange for the 
achievement of specific milestones, about which the question 
 
 79. A commenter at Hacker News opined regarding the Zynga clawback: 
I would argue it is a breach of the initial options agreement (at least in 
spirit).  Those shares were negotiated under a set of conditions—the 
stock was very risky, and as a result worth very little.  Now that 
everything has turned out well, you can't go back and say, “Wait, I 
didn't think it would be worth this much—give it back.”.  Pincus 
wouldn't be going back after a failed venture and forking over huge 
amounts of cash to compensate for worthless stock, now, would he? 
The option price and amount was set previously, and should be honored 
as long as the employee is performing their duties reasonably. 
This is greed in it’s [sic] simplest form. 
damoncali, Comment on HACKER NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3220147. 
 80. Heli C. Wang & Jay B. Barney, Employee Incentives to Make Firm-
Specific Investments: Implications for Resource-Based Theories of Corporate 
Diversification, 31 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 466, 469–71 (2006).  
 81. Id. at 469. 
 82. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937). 
 83. See generally Christine Lagorio, How to Manage an Independent 
Contractor, INC.COM (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.inc.com/guides/managing-
independent-contractors.html (discussing the necessity of setting clear goals to 
guide an independent contractor’s work). 
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‘was the job satisfactorily completed?’ can be answered with a 
yes or no.84  Not all jobs can be readily defined in this way, 
however.  Rather than contracting with someone outside the 
firm, at-will employment within the firm combined with 
vesting stock options is designed to produce incentivized 
workers who can nevertheless be let go quickly if imperfect 
monitoring suggests their performance is inadequate. 
The ongoing employment of a worker in a startup subject 
to the at-will doctrine causes stock options to vest but also 
creates human capital that is specific to the startup and not 
easily removed to another employer should the employee be 
terminated.  If a firm terminates an employee before she 
earns her stock option grant, she loses this firm-specific 
capital.85  Exposure to this penalty acts as a bond against 
shirking, though at-will employment does not always act as a 
bonding device because plenty of at-will employees, such as 
those performing merely routine functions, are not 
accumulating firm-specific human capital while they work.86  
But for those employees who do, the risk that they could be 
terminated at will and lose their firm-specific capital acts as a 
deterrent against shirking and other forms of opportunism.87 
1. Holdup Problems 
The combination of the at-will doctrine and a stock option 
plan as an employment regime is problematic because it 
leaves the final decision of whether an employee is shirking 
in the hands of the employer.  Because the arrangement is at 
will, the employee need not really be shirking or otherwise 
inadequate in order for the firm to terminate her.88  For 
example, a firm may lead an employee to believe, but not 
contractually promise, that if she performs adequately and 
the firm prospers, the firm will retain her long enough for her 
stock options to vest.  In reality, however, she could make her 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. See 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25, § 3.3.  
 86. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using 
Hostages To Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983) (explaining how 
relational contracts rely on hostages or transaction-specific assets). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Porter, supra note 29, at 63 (stating that employers can terminate 
for no reason at all). 
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most important contribution during her first eleven months 
at the firm, and there would be nothing to stop her employer 
from terminating her before any of her stock options vest.89  
In fact, her employer may have an incentive to do so.  The 
employer might reason that however great her contribution 
was during those eleven months, it is now irremovable from 
the firm, and the firm can save significant dilution by firing 
her before her stock options vest.90  Short of this, the 
employer could also behave opportunistically by threatening 
to terminate her, perhaps citing nonexistent shirking as a 
negotiation tactic, and demand a contract renegotiation.  The 
firm sees the opportunity to avoid paying the employee what 
it had informally (and not enforceably) agreed to pay her for a 
contribution that she has already made to the firm and 
cannot get back.  This is the holdup problem emphasized by 
incomplete contract theorists.91 
 
 89. See 2007 Zynga Plan, supra note 25, § 3.3. 
 90. A commenter at Hacker News observed: “I’ve seen people get cheated out 
of compensation this way, in some cases where they took greatly reduced 
salaries, in exchange for shares, but the shares vested, and after creating the 
major innovation the company wanted, they were fired without cause before the 
first vesting cliff.”  nirvana, Comment to Zynga Chief Seeks to Claw Back Stock, 
HACKER NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3218774. 
 91. Leading articles addressing incomplete contracts literature include 
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver 
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 1119 (1990); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and 
Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Benjamin Klein, Contracting 
Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 367, 367–68 (1983); Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of 
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 
(1981); and Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and 
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).  As Smith and 
King explain: 
Where agency theory focuses on fitting compensation to particular 
outcomes, incomplete contract theory focuses on decisionmaking 
procedures and institutional design.  This shift in focus is necessitated 
by the assumption that all contracts are incomplete in the sense that 
they do not specify the obligations of the contracting parties for all 
potential outcomes.  The source of incompleteness is “bounded 
rationality,” a somewhat malleable term that includes an inability to 
negotiate future plans because parties “have to find a common 
language to describe states of the world and actions with respect to 
which prior experience may not provide much of a guide.”  Thus, 
bounded rationality might include an inability to write contracts in 
such a way that they can be enforced by a third party. 
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The classic illustration of the holdup problem involves a 
supplier and a producer who could reach a Pareto-efficient 
arrangement but do not because of the risk of strategic 
behavior by one or both of the parties.92  So, for example, 
imagine a firm, Widgetron, which makes widgets for sale and 
needs to buy some specialized widget-making machines.93  
Widget Machine Suppliers (WMS) could make these machines 
for Widgetron, but to do so, it would have to invest in the 
specialized equipment needed to make them.  If WMS did 
that, however, Widgetron would have increased bargaining 
power.94  There are no other firms that want to buy widget-
making machines.  WMS might invest in building widget-
making machines only to have Widgetron demand to 
renegotiate the contract for buying the machines at a lower 
price.95  Widgetron and WMS may not contract at all, or they 
may have to engage in costly arrangements to make sure one 
does not cheat the other.96  Widgetron may decide to acquire 
the WMS firm or build its own division to do this work rather 
than expose itself to holdups.  What makes holdups possible 
is asset specificity.  If WMS commits itself to specific assets 
(by buying widget-machine-making machines for example), it 
exposes itself to holdup.97  A startup employee is in the same 
 
Smith & King, supra note 57, at 17 (footnotes omitted). 
 92. Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 
J.L. & ECON. 105 (2000).   
 93. Cf. id.  Klein tells the canonical but possibly apocryphal story of GM’s 
acquisition of Fisher, the auto body manufacturer, to avoid holdup problems.  
See id. 
 94. See id. at 117–18. 
  95. See id.  
 96. A nice example of the holdup problem I have witnessed involves what I 
gather is a common practice among the burro drovers who assist climbers and 
trekkers in the Andes.  The burro drovers often negotiate one price at the 
trailhead to move gear up into the mountains, but once the gear has been 
packed on the animals and carried to a remote area, which is still a distance 
from its ultimate destination, the drovers will demand a higher price.  If no new 
agreement is reached, the drovers will abandon the gear far from where 
alternative drovers may be found, forcing the clients to carry the heavy gear 
themselves and possibly to abandon their climb.  The usual result is contract 
renegotiation.  Climbers can also attempt to renegotiate the contract once gear 
has been delivered to its final destination and thus turn the tables of 
opportunism.  If climbers were to buy burros to carry gear into the high passes 
instead of contracting for them, this would be an instance of vertical 
integration.  Klein, supra not 92, at 116–18. 
 97. See id. at 108. 
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position if her contribution to the value of the firm is specific 
and not spread evenly over the period during which her stock 
options vest. 
Holdup opportunities might be more of a problem for 
startup firms than for other firms.  Startups are 
entrepreneurial ventures that operate under conditions of 
pervasive uncertainty.98  The standard four-year vesting 
period is just a rough guess of how long an employee should 
stay at a startup in order for the firm to get the most value 
out of the employee.  In a rapidly evolving market, an 
employee might make any critical contributions she is going 
to make in a matter of months or within a couple of years of 
being hired.  Pervasive uncertainty makes it impossible to 
predict accurately.  Once early employees have made 
whatever firm-specific contributions they are going to make 
and can be replaced by employees who can perform more 
routine work, the early employees are vulnerable to 
opportunistic termination or renegotiation.99  Whether 
renegotiation is actually opportunistic or not depends upon 
the understandings on which the employee relied in accepting 
the employment arrangement in the first place.  If employees 
make firm-specific contributions with the reasonable 
expectation of being employed long enough for all or some 
specific portion of their stock options to vest but are 
terminated before that, as soon as their firm-specific 
contributions are committed, the firm is later acting 
opportunistically if it terminates the employees before their 
options vest. 
2. A Final Period Problem 
Startups might be more likely to hold up employees 
because startup firms are often founded with the purpose of 
achieving a major liquidity event.100  Established firms 
 
 98. See generally Meghan Casserly, Understanding Employee Equity: Every 
Statup’s Secret Weapon, FORBES.COM (Mar. 8, 2013, 5:30 PM) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/2013/03/08/understanding-
employee-equity-bill-harris-sxsw/ (discussing the importance of using stock 
options as part of a compensation package to conserve limited financial 
resources). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist 
Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 994 (2006). 
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operate according to routines that include repeat employment 
transactions that they expect to conduct into the foreseeable 
future.101  Startups, by contrast, hope they operate for a 
relatively short period before an IPO or buyout is realized.102  
This leads to what economists call a final period problem.103  
A final period problem occurs when a repeated process comes 
to an end.104  Incentives that may lead to cooperative behavior 
tend to break down in a final period.105 
Repeat transactions are important because they make 
possible the enforcement and generation of norms.106  Norms 
play an important role in constraining opportunistic behavior 
in employment.  Labor economists report that it is 
uncommon, even in settings where the at-will doctrine 
prevails, for employers to terminate employees without 
cause.107  The existence of these norms would seem mutually 
beneficial to both firms and employees, and it is not 
surprising that they have evolved.108  These norms allow 
employees to rely on the incentives created by stock option 
 
 101. Id. at 1101. 
 102. Id. at 994.  
 103. See MARK HIRSCHEY, MANGERIAL ECONOMICS 559–60 (12th ed. 2009). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at  560. 
 106. A classic study of evolved norms is Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the 
Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 115, 140 (1992) (“[G]eographical concentration, ethnic 
homogeneity, and repeat dealing may be necessary preconditions to the 
emergence of a contractual regime based on reputation bonds.”); see also 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991) (describing norm evolution among ranchers in Shasta County, 
California).  See generally Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically 
Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981) (explaining that Chinese middleman groups 
reduce transaction costs and facilitate exchange in the absence of contract 
laws).  Venture capitalists may not be as ethnically homogenous as diamond 
merchants, Chinese middlemen, or Shasta County ranchers, but they are 
geographically concentrated and engage in repeat transactions.  Besides, Silicon 
Valley does not need ethnic homogeneity to achieve its tightly knit bubble 
culture.  See, e.g., Silicon Valley: Why Are Some People Reluctant to Move to the 
Silicon Valley Despite It Making All Kinds of Sense?, QUORA, 
http://www.quora.com/Silicon-Valley/Why-are-some-people-reluctant-to-move-
to-the-Silicon-Valley-despite-it-making-all-kinds-of-sense (last visited Mar. 6, 
2013). 
 107. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms 
and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1920 (1996). 
 108. See id. at 1919.  
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plans and to make greater efforts for the benefit of the firm 
than they would if they thought there was a substantial 
chance that the firm would behave opportunistically.  Firms 
benefit from these efforts, but maintaining the option of firing 
employees at will allows them greater flexibility to terminate 
employees who do not live up to realistic expectations without 
running the gauntlet of expensive wrongful termination 
litigation.109 
Depending on whether they respect these norms, firms 
develop reputations as good or bad employers.  The 
enforcement mechanism for these employment norms is not 
so much legal as economic.110  A firm that repeatedly fired 
employees before their options vested, even when their 
performance was apparently satisfactory, would get a 
reputation for being an opportunistic employer.111  In a labor 
market that is highly competitive for the best talent, as 
Silicon Valley and similar hubs are, this is a reputation firms 
wish to avoid.112  If a firm plans to continue its operations into 
the foreseeable future, a reputation as a reliable, 
nonopportunistic employer is a critical asset to cultivate and 
protect. 
Norms arising out of reputational markets have 
limitations though.  The initial public offering (IPO) or an 
acquisition by another entity (buyout) of a successful startup 
potentially presents a different situation.  An IPO or buyout 
of a startup is the much hoped for liquidity event that allows 
 
 109. See Warren Martin, Comment, Employment at Will: Just Cause 
Protection Through Mandatory Arbitration, 62 WASH. L. REV. 151, 161 (1987). 
 110. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 107, at 1919.  
 111. One commenter at Hacker News probably spoke for many when he 
opined: 
Silicon Valley isn’t a special place for invention and for startups 
because of special infrastructure or special laws, but because of special 
ideas and special norms.  Those norms don't hold up in court, and they 
erode a little bit every time someone like Pincus only thinks about 
what they can get away with instead of what’s right.  This reduces the 
perceived value of equity for everyone in the valley, makes everyone 
less open, less trusting, less willing to take a risk.  In the end, we all 
lose for that. 
If I had my way, Pincus would never work in this town again.  Anyone 
involved in this decision should be made a pariah.  If we don’t defend 
the norms that make innovation possible, we'll lose them. 
Cactus, supra note 1. 
 112. See generally id.  
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founders and early investors to realize potentially large gains 
on their early investments of entrepreneurial effort and 
capital.113  By their nature, these liquidity events are 
uncommon, even though many startups are founded in hopes 
of attaining them.114  Startup founders and early investors 
can become rich as a result of a successful IPO or buyout. 
These exits are singular enough that few founders 
probably think in terms of repeat company-founding 
transactions,115 although rarely some founder–entrepreneurs 
will have a series of successful exits with big liquidity 
events.116  Because clawbacks can materially increase the 
value of founder stock in an IPO or buyout by reducing 
dilution,117 for most founder–entrepreneurs the benefit to be 
gained from clawing back options from employees on the 
verge of a liquidity event will outweigh any reputational 
effect to be gained from complying with employment norms.118  
Founder–entrepreneurs therefore have powerful financial 
incentives to engage in clawbacks.  These incentives are such 
that approaching IPOs and buyouts can produce final period 
 
 113. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 100, at 994. 
 114. See generally id.  
 115. An important exception is venture capital firms, which are purpose-built 
to invest serially with these exit scenarios in mind.  See generally Ronald J. 
Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070–76 (2003). 
 116. For descriptions of serial entrepreneurs, see Paul Gompers, Anna 
Kovner, Josh Lerner & David Scharfstein, Performance Persistence in 
Entrepreneurship, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 18 (2010).  
 117. See ANNA HUCULAK & DOV BEGUN, OSLER, HARKIN & HARCOURT LLP, 




 118. A commenter at Hacker News opined, “Founders only need to exit once.  
There is surprisingly little incentive for a founder to avoid screwing over 
employees.”  ootachi, Comment to Zynga Chief Seeks to Claw Back Stock, 
HACKER NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3220173.  
But another commenter replied:  
Spoken like a true non-founder...  Reputation is everything.  If a 
founder ever wants to start a company again, screwing over employees 
will haunt him in the long term much worse than any legal 
repercussion that can be fixed with money. So I wager there is a lot 
preventing founders from screwing employees, specially [sic] in 
startups, where people are hyper connected.  
Id. 
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problems.119  These problems include opportunism toward 
employees with significant unvested stock options.120  
Employees may anticipate this opportunism and reduce their 
effort accordingly, or take a different job.121 
The risk of employer-side opportunism will likely be 
greater where founder-entrepreneurs who do not anticipate 
being repeat players are in control of the startup.  This was 
the case with Pincus and Zynga.122  Venture capital firms, 
which are repeat players, are probably more motivated than 
founder-entrepreneurs to conserve their reputations with 
prospective startup employees.  Venture capital firms are in 
the business of funding and often managing startups, and 
hiring the most talented employees they can find is a critical 
part of building a successful startup.123  This suggests that 
startups controlled by their founders, as Zynga was, rather 
than by venture capitalists, are more likely to engage in 
 
 119. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 216–17 (3d ed. 
2000) (describing final period problems). 
 120. See generally id. at 216. 
  121. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 119, at 216–17 (discussing tit-for-tat 
opportunism with employers and employees as their relationship comes to an 
end). 
 122. Pincus’s ownership position before the IPO is described in the IPO 
prospectus as follows: 
The total number of shares of our Class A, Class B and Class C 
common stock reflected in the discussion and tables above is based on 
no shares of our Class A common stock, 562,466,698 shares of our Class 
B common stock (including preferred stock on an as converted basis) 
and 20,517,472 shares of our Class C common stock outstanding, as of 
March 31, 2011 . . . . 
. . . .  
From our inception in October 2007 to date, Mr. Pincus, our Chief 
Executive Officer, Chief Product Officer and the Chairman of our Board 
of Directors, has purchased an aggregate of 149,197,328 shares of our 
common stock.  To date, Mr. Pincus has sold an aggregate of 43,629,310 
shares of our common stock at prices ranging from $0.42 to $13.96.  In 
addition to sales by Mr. Pincus, our other current and former executive 
officers and employees have sold an aggregate of 51,192,501 shares of 
our capital stock at prices ranging from $0.25 to $17.09 per share, 
including, 6,717,161 shares we repurchased from our other executive 
officers and employees.  These sales include two tender offers in 2010 
by third parties in which 383 employees were eligible to participate and 
298 employees decided to participate and sell shares. 
Zynga Inc., Registration Statement Form S-1, 40, 123 (July 1, 2011), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1439404/000119312511180285/ds1 
.htm. 
 123. See Gilson, supra note 115, at 1068. 
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apparently opportunistic clawbacks. 
The seriousness of the threat of employer opportunism in 
startups, where employees must create firm-specific capital 
as quickly as possible if they are to succeed, helps explain the 
existence of venture capital firms.  Venture capital firms are 
not just investment firms, but also management firms.124  
Venture capital firms are relatively undiversified and 
specialized repeat players in the niche market of new 
technology-intensive startups, and they take active roles in 
the management of their portfolio firms.125  This peculiar 
arrangement allows venture capital firms to develop 
reputations not only for their investment acumen but also for 
their management styles.126  Venture capital firms can 
leverage their reputation for actively managing portfolio 
firms in the short- and long-term to serve as a bond against 
opportunistic employment practices by the startups in which 
the venture capital firm invests.127  These firms may exist 
partly because they can serve as a reliable protector of the 
interests of employees against the opportunism of founder-
entrepreneurs.  Venture capitalists have more skin in the 
long game. 
Bonding devices such as venture-capitalist reputation 
may provide some reassurance to prospective employees who 
may otherwise be inclined to discount heavily option-based 
startup employment offers because of the risk of employer 
opportunism.  Incomplete contract theory suggests bonding 
 
 124. See id. at 1072. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Venture capital firms might be considered reputational intermediaries 
as described in Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).  Investment banks are 
reputational intermediaries who vouch for the issuers who sell securities with 
the help of the bank’s intermediation.  Venture capital firms take an active part 
in startup firm management, but they do play something like a reputational 
intermediary role in the labor market.  The venture capital firm’s role in 
management acts to underwrite the reputation of the startup as employer, or 
possibly for some venture capital firms, to undermine it.  Id. 
 127. See William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture Capitalist 
Certification in Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 879, 880 (1991) (arguing that 
venture capitalists play a certification role in initial public offerings).  I suggest 
here they provide a kind of employer certification.  Established companies 
(Google, IBM, etc.) have a reputation that acts as a bond against opportunistic 
termination, to a degree.  Startups rent, one could say, the venture capital 
firm’s reputation for the same purpose. 
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mechanisms will evolve to address holdup problems.128  
Agency theory suggests incentive devices such as stock 
options will be used to align the interests of employees, 
entrepreneur-founders, and investors.129  Startup stock 
options go beyond stock options in established companies, 
which also align incentives, by having a popular and not 
undeserved reputation for potentially being a source of great 
riches.  We turn now to look at how this special aspect of this 
compensatory device may help address contracting problems. 
III. COMPENSATING ENTREPRENEURIAL EMPLOYEES 
Frank Knight observed that an important aspect of 
entrepreneurial judgment is the ability to judge the 
capabilities of others,130 and this is especially apt for startups.  
Startup founders must make entrepreneurial judgments 
when they hire employees, and the imponderability131 of the 
traits they are looking for increases the risk of moral hazard 
and adverse selection.  To manage this risk, some successful 
startups, such as Google, invest heavily in screening new 
hires, to a degree that appeared extraordinary to more 
established industries.132  This approach makes sense if one 
considers that firms exploring new product and market 
spaces are likely to require unusual degrees of intelligence, 
adaptivity, and creativity from their employees, and that the 
lack of these skills may prove especially costly in 
entrepreneurial firms. 
 
 128. Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms 
Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 Del. J. Corp. L. 191, 208–09 (2009). 
 129. See supra Part II.A. 
 130. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 241–42 (1921).  
Knight writes: 
Men differ in their capacity by perception and inference to form correct 
judgments as to the future course of events in the environment.  This 
capacity, furthermore, is far from homogeneous, some persons excelling 
in foresight in one kind of problem situations, others in other kinds, in 
almost endless variety.  Of especial importance is the variation in the 
power of reading human nature, of forecasting the conduct of other 
men, as contrasted with scientific judgment in regard to natural 
phenomena. 
Id. 
 131. Or unobservability. 
 132. See LEVY, supra note 7, passim (discussing Google’s recruiting 
strategies). 
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Startups compensate employees by combining lower 
salaries than they could get at more established companies 
with substantial stock option grants.133  These stock options 
must be valuable to employees because they accept them as 
reasons to turn down larger cash offers.  What are we to 
make of this? 
A startup stock option package is in some ways like a 
lottery ticket in that it gives the holder a chance of a large 
financial windfall.  Calculating the value of a stock option, 
however, is much more complex than calculating the value of 
a lottery ticket.  In the case of a hypothetical lottery ticket, 
one can simply multiply the inverse of the number of tickets 
outstanding by the promised prize to get the expected value of 
the ticket.  So if a million tickets will be sold in a fair lottery 
for a $1 million prize, each ticket has an expected value of 
1/1,000,000 times $1 million, or $1. 
Calculating the value of an option requires a more 
complex formula.  Under the Black-Scholes option-pricing 
model, a number of factors determine the value of a call 
option.134  According to this formula, the greater the positive 
change in the price of the underlying share, the more the 
right to buy it at a fixed price—the stock option—will be 
worth.135  The stock option granted to the employee by the 
startup has a positive-speculation value when it is granted, 
even before it vests, because there is a nonzero probability 
that the underlying stock will attain a value greater than the 
exercise price of the option before it expires.  So a 
hypothetical call option on startup stock with an exercise 
price of $1 has speculative value if there is a possibility that 
the stock will attain some value greater than $1 before the 
option expires.  Intuitively, the reason a stock option has 
value when granted is because there is value to be had even 
in the small probability of a valuable outcome.  In this sense, 
stock options are like lottery tickets—they have value before 
the drawing because they represent a probabilistic 
expectation of future value. 
 
 133. Bankman, supra note 55, at 1750. 
 134. See generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options 
and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973). 
 135. See id. at 640–45. 
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Some of the present value of unvested stock options 
comes from the possibility that the price of the underlying 
stock will reach improbably high levels, as they might after a 
very successful IPO.136  In terms of present value, however, 
this amount is likely to be modest because the probability of a 
successful IPO, let alone a spectacular one, is small in 
absolute terms.137  It seems likely that the modest expected 
value of stock options when granted is not a large part of 
what prospective startup employees are bargaining for when 
they choose to work for an entrepreneurial startup rather 
than an established firm.  Even with the present value of 
startup stock option packages included, established 
companies probably offer higher salaries than startups.138  
Startups must therefore offer something more to their 
employees that is not captured by the modest present values 
of their stock option packages combined with cash salaries. 
This something more is not well captured by conventional 
microeconomic models, which assume individuals are risk-
averse utility maximizers.139  State lottery authorities exploit 
this deviation of actual human behavior from conventional 
microeconomics to raise billions of dollars for state treasuries 
each year.140  A lottery ticket might have an expected value of 
less than the $1 it sells for because it represents, say, a one in 
more-than-one-million chance to win $1 million.  A rational, 
risk-neutral, or risk-averse person should not be willing to 
pay $1 for such a ticket.  Yet millions of people are more than 
willing to buy chances of this kind.141  Why they do this is 
something of a puzzle for economists.142  A plausible 
explanation is that lottery tickets are different from other 
negative-expected-value investments because they represent 
the real, if remote possibility for buyers of attaining great 
 
 136. See generally id. 
 137. Less than two percent of startups make it to IPO.  Ben Livson, BAL 
CONSULTING P/L, VALUATION OF STARTUPS, 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.bal.com.au/valuations.pdf. 
 138. Bankman, supra note 55, at 1750. 
 139. See generally RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES 
AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 63–78 (1992). 
 140. See Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It 
Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 71, 108–109. 
 141. See generally id. at  75–80. 
 142. See id. 
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wealth, while risking only what the lottery ticket buyer 
believes he can afford to lose. 
This phenomenon has a parallel in the startup world.  
Some prospective employees probably agree to work for 
startups for a combination of salary and stock options, the 
combined present value of which is less than they could get at 
established companies, for reasons similar to why people buy 
lottery tickets—because of the possibility, even if remote, that 
the stock options will make them wealthy.  In this view, it is 
precisely the possibility of becoming a Google chef that 
entices entrepreneurially minded workers to work for startup 
ventures that have a small but real possibility of making 
them rich.  By saying they wanted to avoid a Google chef 
situation, Zynga’s managers were getting things backwards.  
In the startup world, one could say, almost everybody wants 
to be, if not a Google founder, at least a Google chef. 
A. Who Are Entrepreneurial Employees? 
There is an important difference between the 
entrepreneurial startup worker and the lottery ticket buyer, 
however.  The lottery ticket buyer is just gambling.  He is 
hoping that a random number generator will come up with 
the number he just happens to have chosen or had assigned 
to him.  Choosing a startup to work for is by contrast a game 
of skill, at least in part.  When a prospective employee decides 
to accept a job offer from a particular startup, she is making 
an entrepreneurial judgment.  One standard method of 
decision making would have the prospective employee 
compare these two offers and choose the one with the greater 
present value.  Yet faced with this choice, the prospective 
employee chooses the startup.  Why?  A prospective employee 
who chooses to work for a startup that offers an employment 
package with a lower expected value, but with a subjectively 
more attractive stock option package than she would get at an 
established company, may have either or a combination of 
two motives.  The first I call an “entrepreneurial motive” and 
the second a “gambling motive.” 
In most instances, the entrepreneurial motive is probably 
more important.  When a prospective employee, E, decides to 
take the lower paying job with a startup, she is making an 
entrepreneurial investment or bet in the startup company 
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with a portion of her total human capital.  Intuitively, her 
total human capital may be seen as the present value of the 
maximum income stream she could produce with her human 
capital, by working for an established company.  Suppose that 
the present expected value of the most E could earn over the 
next four years is $400,000, and that this would, by 
hypothesis, come from working for an established company at 
about $100,000 per year to be paid to her in a cash salary.  
Alternatively, if E decided to work instead for four years for a 
startup for nothing but stock options, she could be said to be 
making an investment of her $400,000 in human capital in 
the startup in exchange for the options.  If E decides, as is 
more typical, to work for a startup for a cash salary lower 
than she could get from an established company, then her 
investment is equal to the opportunity cost of her decision.  
The opportunity cost is the difference between the present 
value of her total compensation at the startup and the 
present value of what her total compensation would have 
been at the her best available alternative, here an established 
company. 
It may be that the prospective employee makes a 
judgment that the stock option package offered by the startup 
is actually more valuable than it would be judged to be worth 
by a more objective observer, such as an appraisal firm or a 
bank, applying a standard valuation methodology.  The 
prospective employee may make a higher valuation judgment 
for a number of reasons.  She may have information that the 
capital market at large does not have because of her 
specialized technical background.  She may have tried the 
startup’s product personally and developed a conviction that 
it is going to be a disruptive force in its market.  The 
prospective employee may appreciate the talent of team 
members already working for the startup, or developments 
that she believes are likely to be coming in the relevant 
market, more than does the capital market generally.  In 
short, she knows better than the market.143  Startup founders 
 
 143. See generally ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNITY 
AND PROFIT: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1979).  For a 
summary of Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship, see ROBERT F. HÉBERT & 
ALBERT N. LINK, THE ENTREPRENEUR: MAINSTREAM VIEWS AND RADICAL 
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frequently take care to keep information about their products, 
technology, and market plans private, revealing such 
information only to prospective employees and investors, and 
then only subject to nondisclosure agreements.144  This 
information may lead the prospective employee to decide that 
despite what other—arguably more objective, but less 
informed, or less perceptive—evaluators may think, the total 
compensation package from the startup has a higher present 
value than the compensation package offered by the 
established company.  The investment of her labor in the 
startup is entrepreneurial in the sense that she perceives an 
opportunity where others do not. 
B. Gambling Employees 
Part of the reason some employees choose to work for 
startups, when they could earn a bigger salary working for an 
established firm, may be that they enjoy taking risks.  Many 
people gamble for fun.145 
Gambling is different from entrepreneurship.  Invoking 
Israel Kirzner’s conception, one may see entrepreneurship as 
perceiving (or thinking one perceives) an opportunity that the 
market generally does not (because if the market had already 
incorporated the opportunity, it would no longer exist).  An 
entrepreneur may perceive that railroad cars may double as 
shipping containers on properly designed ships, reducing 
shipping costs, and creating profit opportunities.146  Or that 
packages may be shipped more efficiently through central 
 
CRITIQUES 132–34 (2d ed. 1988); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF THE 
MARKET PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN AUSTRIAN 
ECONOMICS (1992); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST 
PROCESS (1985); ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, MARKET THEORY AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 
(1963). 
 144. William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to 
Employee Mobility in High Technology Industries, 17 LAB. LAW. 25, 70–71 
(2001). 
 145. See Renee M. Cunningham-Williams et al., Prevalence and Predictors of 
Pathological Gambling: Results from the St. Louis Personality, Health and 
Lifestyle (SLPHL) Study, 39 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 377, 378 (2005) (finding that 
more than eighty percent of the U.S. population gambles at some time in their 
lives). 
 146. See, e.g., Hugh L. Randall et al., Railroad Operational Panel, 28 
TRANSP. L.J. 447, 456–57 (2001). 
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hubs.147  The entrepreneur perceives an opportunity and 
enters the market to realize the opportunity.  Gambling, 
strictly speaking, is different.  In roulette, for example, there 
is no better chance that a red number will come up than a 
black number.148  A gambler engages in pure speculation, 
merely hoping he has guessed right that the next spin will 
produce the sort of number he has chosen.  There is no 
pretense here of perceiving more accurately than anyone else 
where the ball will stop.  Many people find betting on these 
guesses entertaining, and taking stock options in lieu of cash 
from a startup may appeal to some simply as an opportunity 
to play the odds.149  Taking pay in stock options can also mix 
entrepreneurial investment and gambling in an interesting 
way. 
C. Mixed Games and Leveraged Rewards 
Some games test both a player’s superior powers of 
opportunity perception and his luck.  Business 
entrepreneurship is surely one of these.  Most successful 
entrepreneurs will concede that luck played a significant role 
in their success, though some are more willing than others to 
give Fortuna her due.150  Entrepreneurs must bear the risk 
not only that they are wrong about the existence of a 
profitable opportunity but also the risk that however good 
their idea may be, something unforeseen may go wrong, or 
that in order for the business to prosper, something 
 
 147. See Stuart Auerbach, Big Delivery Firms Maneuver for Position: 
Companies Striving for Bigger Share of Busy Washington Market, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 18, 1988, at F1; see also Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: 
The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005). 
 148. Don Baker, Roulette, 91 MATHEMATICS TCHR. 743, 818 (1998). 
 149. Vince Martin, Using Stock Options to Gamble on Gambling Stocks, 
CalvinAyre.com (Mar. 26, 2012), http://calvinayre.com/2012/03/26/business/ 
investing-the-hard-way-using-stock-options-gamble-on-gambling-stocks/. 
 150. Compare 10 Questions for Ken Hendricks, INC. (Dec. 1, 2006), 
http://www.inc.com/magazine/20061201/entrepreneur-questions.html (“The 
most overrated skill is skill.  Luck is more important.  The entrepreneur gets 
credit for being this genius, when really he was just at the right place at the 
right time.”), with John W. Rogers, Separating Luck From Skill, FORBES.COM 
(Nov. 13, 2009, 2:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/1130/finance-
carnival-ariel-basketball-patient-investor.html (“[O]ver time, skill shines 
through as luck evens out.” (quoting MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN, THINK TWICE: 
HARNESSING THE POWER OF COUNTERINTUITION 123 (2009))). 
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unforeseen must go right.  How much of a business success 
should be attributed to entrepreneurial genius and how much 
to luck, however, is rarely clear. 
This ambiguity creates the opportunity for the lucky 
person to leverage his luck into the appearance of genius.  He 
may wish to do this because entrepreneurial geniuses have 
more prestige than the merely lucky.  One may envy lottery 
winners, but one both envies and admires entrepreneurial 
geniuses.  This leveraging opportunity is another enticement 
of working for a startup that may attract some prospective 
employees.  This ambiguity has a value that is part of what 
the high risk startup can offer prospective employees.  The 
prospective employee may in truth have no idea whether the 
venture will succeed or not.  But if it does, and he becomes 
rich, those who attribute his fortune purely to luck will 
merely appear envious.  Thus a startup presents, to some, the 
opportunity to play a kind of lottery where the winner gets to 
claim, not his luck, but his judgment was rewarded.  
Furthermore, it takes courage to bet on one’s judgments.  The 
winner of a startup lottery gets credit for being both smart 
and brave as measured in units that are legal tender for 
every visible signal of success.  These bragging rights might 
seem a trivial benefit, but one must consider that in the high 
technology startup realm the employees firms seek out tend 
to come from ferociously competitive disciplines and fields of 
study.  Elite mathematicians, scientists, and engineers are 
notorious for loving competitions in which they pit their 
brainpower against one another.  The opportunity of a great 
financial windfall would be less appealing to them if it did not 
also represent a way, if not to prove, then to at least plausibly 
claim superior intellect as well. 
D. Big Prizes 
The appeal of big prizes scarcely needs to be explained.  If 
prizes are big enough, they hold out the prospect of being life 
transforming.151  Startup stock option packages offer the 
 
 151. “The gargantuan [prizes] and lilliputian [odds of winning] of lotto games 
make apparent what they are fundamentally about—the consumer is sacrificing 
the probability of winning for the possibility of an enormous payoff.”  Lloyd R. 
Cohen, The Lure of the Lottery, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 714 (2001).  “The 
lottery ticket is an input into the dream of wealth.  A dream of wealth will only 
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prospect of such big prizes.  If a startup achieves a 
spectacular IPO or buyout, employee stock options can turn 
into significant personal fortunes, the kind that can finance a 
life that eschews ordinary work and delves into the further 
reaches of personal fulfillment and indulgence.  Google chef 
Ayers realized his dream and opened his own restaurant.152  
Other beneficiaries of successful startups have bought houses, 
jets, yachts, sport teams, elaborate world tours, and the list 
goes on and on.153  Former startup employees often strike out 
on their own entrepreneurial ventures or turn to personal 
scientific, philanthropic or other rewarding if not 
remunerative pursuits.154  The prospect of wealth on this life-
changing scale has a special appeal that goes beyond the 
modest present expected value of the chance to get it.  
Startups know this and entice employees with the prospect of 
wealth beyond anything they could earn working for a 
company whose growth has already plateaued. 
IV. CAN STARTUP EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS BE 
IMPROVED? 
The combination of at-will employment and stock options 
is well established among startups as the preferred mode for 
employing nonfounder, non-C-level employees.155  Can it be 
improved?  Does it need to be?  Is there an approach that 
 
be liberating to the extent that one believes that it will fundamentally 
transform one’s life.”  Id. at 730. 
 152. See Lynn Andriani, Finding Google: A Chef’s Story, CNNMONEY (Sept. 
30, 2008, 9:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/29/smallbusiness/tastes_of 
_google.fsb/index.htm. 
 153. See generally Jennifer Booton, Facebook’s Overnight Millionaires Begin 
Lavish Spending Spree, FOX BUSINESS (May 18, 2012), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2012/05/18/facebook-overnight-
millionaires-start-luxurious-spending-spree/; Glenn Hellman, A Startup 
Founder’s Holiday Wish List, STARTUP AMERICA PARTNERSHIP, 
www.s.co/content/startup-founder’s-holiday-wish-list (last visited April 27, 
2013); Mallory Ortberg, Homeland Security Took Michael Arrington’s Boat 
Because ‘America Is Myspace,’ GAWKER.COM (Feb. 23, 2013, 12:09 PM), 
http://gawker.com/5986416/homeland-security-took-michael-arringtons-boat-
because-america-is-myspace. 
 154. See, e.g., Alex Knapp, Billionaires to Announce New Space Startup Next 
Week, FORBES (Apr. 19, 2012, 10:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp 
/2012/04/19/billionaires-to-announce-new-space-startup-next-week/. 
 155. Nalin Kulatilaka & Alan J. Marcus, Valuing Employee Stock Options, 50 
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 1, 46 (1994). 
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would overall be better for both employees and startups?  If 
Zynga clawbacks become more common and startups 
encounter more difficulty hiring the employees they want, 
then the answers might all be yes.  On the other hand, the 
Zynga clawback might be an outlier unlikely to be repeated, 
the product of a particularly aggressive founder,156 especially 
disappointing employees within a company that was 
approaching a highly anticipated IPO, or both.  Or it may be 
that the Zynga clawback is symptomatic of a deeper problem 
that will threaten to emerge whenever a founder-
entrepreneur-controlled firm approaches a large payoff. 
In this section, I propose a modification to the standard 
arrangement that employees and startups could adopt that 
would alleviate some of the problems revealed by the Zynga 
clawback.  The basic idea of the proposal is that, at the time 
of hiring, the employee and the startup firm negotiate a 
buyback right that would give the firm the right to buy back 
prior to a liquidity event all (or some) of the employee’s 
unvested (or unexercised) stock options at a price agreed on 
when the employee is hired.  The firm would be able to 
exercise this right during some set period of time before an 
IPO or buyout, such as six or twelve months.  During this 
same period, however, the firm would be contractually bound 
not to terminate the employee without cause, unless it 
exercised its option to buy back the options at the agreed 
 
 156. See generally Peter Jamison, Former Zynga Employees Talk About 
Copying Games for Mark Pincus’ ‘Evil’ Online Empire, SF WEEKLY (Sept. 7, 
2010, 5:32 PM), http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2010/09/zynga_pincus_copy 
_games.php.  Jamison writes: 
Pincus is a deeply controversial figure, and internal documents reveal 
that he’s not just the subject of griping among his workers.  A 
confidential memo produced for the venture-capital firm Kleiner 
Perkins Caufield & Byers, a major early Zynga investor, expressed 
reservations about Pincus’ management style.  “Mark needs strong 
lieutenants to keep him from micromanaging,” stated the document, 
which was obtained by SF Weekly. 
The former senior employee who says he was present for Pincus’ “No 
Innovation” speech jokingly sums up Zynga’s corporate ethos as an 
inversion of Google's famous “Don't Be Evil” motto.  “Zynga’s motto is 
‘Do Evil,’ ”  he says.  “I would venture to say it is one of the most evil 
places I've run into, from a culture perspective and in its business 
approach.  I've tried my best to make sure that friends don't let friends 
work at Zynga.” 
Id. 
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price.  The provision could also allow the firm to buy back the 
options without terminating the employee.  The buyback 
price, it is envisioned, would represent an ex ante estimate of 
how much the stock options would be worth if they vested 
before a liquidity event that represented a reasonably 
successful exit for the investors, but not a spectacular 
success. 
This proposal is motivated partly by the belief that the 
Zynga clawback is not some freakish anomaly but is more 
likely the result of predictable biases in human behavior.  
Empirical studies (as well as common experience) suggest 
that people tend to overestimate the value of their own 
contributions to joint projects.157  Similarly, it seems likely 
that founder-entrepreneurs will tend to underestimate the 
value of employees’ contributions to firm value given that the 
larger the estimate the founder makes of an employee’s value, 
the less the founder will himself be getting from an IPO or 
buyout.  For the reasons discussed above, entrepreneurial 
founders, as well as employees, especially prize large payoffs.  
This aggravates what is essentially a pie-division problem.158  
The current structure of startup compensation invites 
renegotiation of how the pie is to be divided just as a large 
payoff looms on the horizon.  These are the very 
circumstances likely to lead to feelings of aggrievement by 
employees if their options are clawed back, and by founders if 
they are not.  That employees and founders should reach an 
agreement under these circumstances that leaves all parties 
feeling they have received what they are entitled to seems 
almost a psychological impossibility. 
A. Contract as a Reference Point 
A better approach might be available.  One way to look at 
the problem is suggested by the recent work of economists 
 
 157. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive 
Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44, 46–50 (Kenneth J. 
Arrow et al. eds., 1995); Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining 
Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 
119–21 (1997). 
 158. See generally H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(1994); Hugo Steinhaus, The Problem of Fair Division, 16 ECONOMETRICA 101 
(1948). 
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Hart and Moore on contracts as reference points.159  Their 
intuition, crudely summarized, is that if parties get at time 
one what they already agreed they would get when they made 
their contract at time zero, then they will not feel 
aggrieved.160  This will enable them to go forward in their 
contractual relationship without shading.  Shading is what 
Hart and Moore call the merely perfunctory performance one 
would expect out of an aggrieved employee who feels her 
employer has treated her badly.161  Hart and Moore assume 
perfunctory performance would comply with the contract 
strictly speaking, and so give rise to no legal remedy, but 
would be less than the consummate performance the 
employer hopes for.162 
A simple analogy may help here.  Imagine your neighbor 
is getting his house painted.  It turns out you like the color he 
has chosen, and the painters inadvertently bought too much 
paint for that job.  You realize the cost to them of painting 
your house, given that they already have the paint (which 
cannot be resold because it has already been mixed to its 
particular hue) would be only $1000.  Normally, you would 
have to pay $5000 to get your house painted, and that is also 
the value to you of the job.  You and the painters agree that 
they should paint your house, and you put off agreeing on the 
price until they are finished, or nearly so.  When it comes 
time to settle up, however, the entirely predictable happens—
the parties disagree on the fair price. 
The homeowner declares that $1000 is the fair price.  
This covers the cost of the labor (let us assume there was no 
opportunity cost for the job; the painters would otherwise 
have been idle) and the paint had already been paid for and 
would have been wasted had it not been used on your house.  
The painters declare with equal justice that the price should 
be $5000.  This is the fair market value of the work done, and 




 159. See generally Hart & Moore, supra note 24, passim. 
 160. Id. at 5–6. 
 161. See id. at 9. 
 162. See id. at 3, 6. 
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Contract law scholars may want to argue here over 
whether a court should award the painters on the basis of 
their reliance cost ($1000) or under restitution ($5000),163 but 
that is not the point here.  Both parties sensibly realize that 
litigation costs would eat up any gain they are likely to get by 
insisting on their way.  The parties agree to settle on a price 
between $1000 and $5000, say, $2500.  But here is the point: 
even though the parties agree on this settlement, they both 
feel aggrieved by the result.  This means the ongoing 
relationship of the parties will not be optimal.  Paint jobs are 
often not really over when the painters leave the site—missed 
spots will be noticed, equipment may be left behind, and 
usually there are understandings that painters will return to 
take care of these problems—but that is not the case here 
because the painters are aggrieved.  The homeowner will pay, 
but only at the last moment, and will not offer a good 
reference and may even put it about that the painters should 
be avoided.  Hart and Moore provide a mathematical model of 
these costs, and show that the costs of aggrievement are 
deadweight losses and prevent parties from attaining the 
maximum benefit of their exchange.164 
Parties can avoid aggrievement costs by using the 
contract to set a reference point from the outset, as Hart and 
Moore explain.165  Take an alternative scenario: the 
homeowner and the painters agree ex ante on a price of 
$2500.  When the job is finished, the homeowner pays 
promptly.  The painters leave, but come back to touch up and 
collect items left behind.  The homeowner provides a positive 
reference.  The value of the exchange is maximized.166 
The at-will-plus-stock-options employment arrangement 
used by startups has problems similar to those of other 
employment contracts where the price paid for services is 
negotiated (or renegotiated) after the services have been 
rendered.  In the startup setting, the problem may arise if the 
liquidity event is unexpectedly large.  The founder-
entrepreneur may have anticipated a more normal liquidity 
 
 163. See generally Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in 
Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1755, 1755–67. 
 164. See Hart & Moore, supra note 24, at 8–13. 
 165. See id. at 2. 
 166. See id. at passim. 
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event and calculated the expected cost of various employees 
in those terms.  A larger than expected liquidity event, 
however, changes the implicit cost (in absolute terms) of 
employees.  Google founders may have realized, for example, 
that they had inadvertently agreed to pay their chef more 
than $4 million per year.  Especially when they realized some 
of this money was coming from them personally, the founders 
might have felt aggrieved, especially if they estimated, as 
human bias makes likely, that the cook’s contribution was 
less valuable than what his options turned out to be worth.  
Google founders did not attempt (as far as I know) to 
renegotiate Ayers’s option package, but they probably could 
have had they chosen to.  Zynga did renegotiate option 
packages, and other startups may do the same as they 
approach big liquidity events.  Even where firms do not 
renegotiate option packages, this may cloak feelings of 
aggrievement among firms that feel they have 
overcompensated employees, and lead to shading by firms.  
Using the employment contract as a reference point would 
ameliorate these problems. 
We may use an alternative history of the Google chef to 
illustrate.  If Ayers had worked for Google and had some of 
his options clawed back, he might have continued to work for 
the company afterwards, but he might have felt aggrieved 
and his cooking may have suffered.  On the other hand, if the 
firm had not clawed back any of his options, Page, Brin, and 
other controlling shareholders might have been unable to 
enjoy his fare as they calculated in their heads how many 
thousands of dollars each meal was costing them and felt 
aggrieved about it.  This sour dilemma arises when the actual 
compensation a startup employee gets is not really negotiated 
in advance because the clawback door is left unlocked and 
most likely won’t be opened until a big liquidity event is 
looming. 
Suppose instead the buyback option proposed here was 
written into Ayers’s stock option plan and Ayers’s stock 
options were subject to a buyback right at a total price of, say, 
$8 million.  This would be the amount Ayers agreed to when 
he accepted his job at the company.  As a spectacular IPO 
approached, the firm would buy back his options for $8 
million, much less than he would have gotten without the 
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buyback, but a big windfall nonetheless, enough for Ayers to 
start his own restaurant.  The Google chef would have no 
reason to feel aggrieved and neither would his employer.  If 
$8 million did not seem like a big enough prize to be worth 
the cut in pay the chef would take to work at the startup, he 
could bargain for more ex ante. 
This proposal suggests a buyback term that would be in 
effect for one year prior to defined liquidity events, such as 
IPOs and buyouts.  To be effective, this term would need to 
have flip-in rights that would be triggered after the fact, in 
the event an employee was terminated and then within one 
year after the startup had an IPO or buyout.167  This would 
obviously and significantly limit the power of the firm to 
terminate employees without cause in the period before a 
liquidity event.  In the event of an unanticipated transaction, 
such as an unexpected buyout from an acquirer that appeared 
suddenly on the scene, the rights of terminated employees 
would resurface and have the effect of diluting the equity of 
existing shareholders.   
Hiring an employee with the sort of protective buyback 
provision proposed here would obviously be more expensive to 
the firm than hiring without it.  Whether this cost would be 
justified would depend on whether the firm anticipated that 
 
 167. By flip-in rights, I mean rights to sell unvested options back to the 
issuing firm at a set price that would be triggered by a liquidity event that 
occurred within six or twelve months (or some other period, as negotiated) after 
the termination date of the employee.  Suzanne S. Dawson et al., Poison Pill 
Defensive Measures, 42 BUS. LAW. 423, 424 (1987).  Thus certain rights 
pertaining to the stock options would have to survive termination.  The stock 
option plan would have to be drafted to provide for this, but this presents no 
insuperable drafting issues.  The proposal may be overbroad in that it would 
cover employees who were terminated nonopportunistically pre-IPO or buyout, 
but this could be mitigated by allowing for the for-cause termination not 
triggering the rights of employees, as in these cases an employee was actually 
failing to perform to reasonable expectations.  What would seem difficult or 
perhaps impossible would be to have an employment arrangement that both 
enabled, as under current law, an employer to terminate without cause before a 
liquidity event, without having to take any steps to substantiate inadequate 
performance, and at the same time, substantial limits to the scope of possible 
employer opportunism.  Essentially, curtailing the freedom that an employer 
enjoys under at-will doctrine to some degree seems necessary if one wants to 
reduce the scope of possible employer opportunism before liquidity events.  
Whether this cost to the employer is justified depends on how valuable this 
term would be to a potential employee and how this value would be shared 
between employer and employee. 
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the benefits of assuring prospective employees against 
employer opportunism would be greater.  No doubt some 
prospective employees would not have the bargaining power 
to insist on such a protective provision and would accept 
options subject to a clawback provision.  C-level employees, 
such as star CEOs that startups sometimes hire, often 
negotiate severance packages that guarantee them certain 
benefits, including stock options, should they be terminated 
before a certain term.168  The proposal here is envisioned as a 
middle-ground level of protection that would be more than 
non-C-level employees currently get but less than what star 
C-level employees frequently negotiate. 
My proposal deserves consideration because there is no 
clear reason why the best and brightest prospective startup 
employees should not be worried about Zynga clawbacks.  The 
fact is that however attractive the stock option packages that 
startups dangle before them may be, as the law stands now, 
startups can attempt to renegotiate them in anticipation of a 
particularly successful IPO or buyout.  Employees then will 
be left in the unenviable position of either accepting a 
diminished option package or getting fired.  They can sue, but 
the law is not on their side.  At-will employment, although 
unloved by law professors, is still the law in California and 
most other states.169  Such employment relationships allow an 
employer to fire an employee without reason, and a without-
cause termination will render worthless any unvested stock 
the employee may have.  While repeat-player venture 
capitalists have good reason to avoid the reputational hit that 
opportunistic-seeming option renegotiations might inflict on 
their reputations as fair-minded managers of portfolio 
companies, founder-entrepreneurs who are about to become 
billionaires do not have the same incentives.  For them, 
option renegotiations take place in something much more like 
a final period, and the options they claw back will go to make 
less diluted their stake and those of other founders and early 
investors.  Doing this will have a cost for the firm in terms of 
aggrieved employees, but the founders may figure that the 
 
 168. Jonathan M. Ocker & Gregory C. Scheck, Employment Agreements for 
New Economy Chief Executives, L.A. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 21, 22 (2000). 
 169. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (2012). 
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most creative phase of those employees who will be aggrieved 
is past anyway.  Founders deciding whether to claw back 
options inevitably will be making biased judgments, 
comparing the value of their own contributions to those of 
employees to whom they wish they had given less.  All of this 
is foreseeable, and the best and brightest of prospective 
startup employees are smart enough to foresee it, especially 
with the Zynga clawback having served as a precedent.  They 
may want some protection against this contingency. 
The buyback commitment has some disadvantages for 
the firm.  Terminating employees could not so easily 
replenish option pools.170  Accounting rules would probably 
require that options of terminated employees be treated as 
outstanding for the period during which they could still flip-in 
in the event a liquidity event occurred.171  Rational employers 
would want to invest more in screening techniques before 
they hired any employees who would not be so easily 
terminated. 
But there would be benefits for the firm as well.  
Especially prized prospects might be more likely to accept 
offers from firms that offered option buyback protection.  On 
the other hand, even just offering the option of buyback 
protection would give the prospective hire the opportunity to 
reject the offer and thereby signal that she was so confident 
that she would be of ongoing value to the firm that she did 
not want to trade the possibility of an especially spectacular 
windfall for protection against opportunism.  It is also the 
case that buybacks might operate to the firm’s benefit by 
taking advantage of the difficulty most people have in 
calculating the utility to them of large sums of money.  So 
how likely is it that an employee about to be hired for an 
annual salary of $90,000 per year would much distinguish 
between two otherwise equal jobs, one of which was subject to 
a $50 million option buyback provision, and the other, to a 
$100 million provision?  Most people in that position would 
 
 170. See generally Ryan Roberts, What is an Option Pool?, STARTUP LAWYER 
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://startuplawyer.com/stock-options/what-is-an-option-pool 
(explaining stock option pools in startup firms). 
 171. See Robert J. Friedman et al., Executive Compensation, in 2 CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE ANSWER BOOK: 2011–12, at 1043, 1086 (Christopher A. Myers & 
Kwamina Thomas Williford, eds., 2011). 
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probably find it difficult to imagine that their lives would be 
much different with the extra $50 million, the first $50 
million having provided enough to leapfrog out of the usual 
trials of working for a living.172  Yet this $50 million in stock 
that the company did not have to issue to an employee could 
make a material difference for the founders and investors of a 
startup firm on the eve of a spectacular IPO, especially when 
one considers that the equity positions of a number of 
employees could be similarly capped. 
Whether an option buyback term would act as a reference 
point depends on there being a substantial psychological 
difference to both employer and employee between options 
getting clawed back and options being bought back according 
to the terms on an earlier agreement.  It seems likely the 
psychological difference between these two financially 
equivalent events would be substantial, even if we assume 
that an employee in the first case should know that her 
options could be clawed back under threat of termination.  
Clawbacks would always be discretionary unless a firm 
announced in advance that it intended to clawback all options 
in the event of a big enough IPO, which would lead to 
widespread employee dissatisfaction.  Few employees will be 
so dispassionate that they will acknowledge the justice of 
being selected as one of the few whose options are being 
clawed back.  To the contrary, these employees are likely to 
feel aggrieved.  If employees know in advance that the value 
of their options is capped, however, while they may wish they 
had not agreed to those terms, they are unlikely to feel 
cheated by the enforcement of terms they agreed to.  
Similarly, employers may wish they had not agreed to a 
provision like the one proposed here, which makes it 
impossible to clawback options before an IPO or buyback.  
The firm might wish it had set a lower cap or thought to 
terminate the perfunctory employee enough in advance of the 
liquidity event to avoid even the capped dilution the employee 
will cause.  But the firm is unlikely to feel aggrieved.  The 
costly suboptimal performance expected of aggrieved parties 
 
 172. See generally REUVEN BRENNER & GABRIELLE A. BRENNER, GAMBLING 
AND SPECULATION: A THEORY, A HISTORY, AND A FUTURE OF SOME HUMAN 
DECISIONS 19–48 (1990) (speculating that people gamble in order to leapfrog). 
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is unlikely to follow. 
B. More Disclosure 
This Article has proceeded under the realistic assumption 
that if startup employees did not realize that firms could claw 
back their unvested stock options, they do now, given the 
notoriety of the Zynga clawback within the technology 
industries.  Another more basic problem would exist, 
however, if employees did not realize this.  Even if employees 
now realize in a general way that firms may claw back 
unvested stock options, they do not have any authoritative 
statement of this possibility, beyond what they have read 
about Zynga on industry-focused websites.  This problem can, 
and probably should, be addressed under the disclosure 
requirements of the federal securities laws. 
Private companies that use stock options to compensate 
their employees typically rely on Rule 701 issued under 
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933.173  Rule 701 
provides a clearer exemption from registration under the 
1933 Act than was available under the previously used 
Sections 4(1) and 4(2).174  As private companies grow, it can 
happen (and indeed did to Google and Facebook) that they 
approach or crossover the boundary of a private company: 
they have assets of more than $10 million and have at least 
500 holders of any class of securities.175  When this happens, 
they are subject to the reporting requirements of section 12(g) 
of the 1934 Exchange Act.176  However, the SEC made 
exceptions for companies that crossed this boundary because 
they had issued stock options to many employees, and in 2007 
it promulgated Rule 12h-1, which reflects the conditions it 
had set out in various no-action letters, exempting 
compensatory stock options, under certain conditions, from 
 
 173. Richard P. Plumridge & Jennifer D’Alessandro, Rule 701: Securities Act 
of 1933 Exemption for Issuances Under Compensatory Benefit Plans, in PRIVATE 
PLACEMENTS 2007, at 521, 524 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook 
Series No. 1598, 2007). 
 174. For a good introduction to the structure of the Securities Act of 1933, see 
Thomas Lee Hazen, The Structure of the Securities Act of 1933, SR043 ALI-ABA 
41 (May 13–14, 2010). 
 175. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4(a)(2) (2012). 
 176. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4. 
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Section 12(g).177  One of these conditions, relevant to us, is 
that the company disclose to the option holder the risks 
associated with the investment.178 
The principal focus of this risk disclosure is the financial 
condition of the company.179  However, it should certainly 
count as a risk factor that an unvested stock option, though 
granted, may be clawed back.  Indeed, companies doubtless 
disclose to employees far more remote risks associated with 
their option than that it may simply be taken away under 
various circumstances.  If the SEC is going to require that 
compensatory stock options be accompanied by risk 
disclosures (at least in the case of a company relying on the 
Rule 12h-1 exemption), then consistency requires that the 
risk of a clawback be disclosed along with other less direct 
risks. 
One could argue that employees already know, and 
receive adequate disclosure already, that they are at-will 
employees and that their options remain unvested until they 
remain in the employ of the company for certain periods of 
time.  They should know, one could argue, that if they 
perform inadequately they will be terminated and lose their 
unvested options, or that they may be demoted, and have to 
accept a smaller stock option package.  This common sense 
understanding does not cover the equally likely case that 
while the employee performed adequately or well—by all 
accounts, after all, Google chef Ayers was a fine cook180—the 
company may decide that in light of how valuable the 
company has become, it believes it simply granted too many 
options to the employee and wants some back.  It is hard to 
imagine a risk factor that would be more material than 
that.181  Once company lawyers have developed standard 
language disclosing this risk, the cost of including it in 
disclosures would be low. 
 
 177. Exemption of Compensatory Employee Stock Options, 72 Fed. Reg. 
69554 (Dec. 7, 2007). 
 178. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-1(f)(1)(vi). 
 179. 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 4:14 (2012). 
 180. Levy, supra note 7, at 133. 
 181. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), for a 
discussion of materiality in securities fraud cases. 
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CONCLUSION 
When Zynga clawed back unvested stock options before 
its IPO, it arguably violated an informal but legally 
unenforceable norm of Silicon Valley startup culture.  At least 
some of the commentary found on industry websites and in 
the press suggested so.182  The combination of at-will 
employment and generous stock option plans gives startups 
extraordinary flexibility in both hiring and firing employees.  
Firms can fire employees without cause and employees’ 
unvested options are evaporated, but employees can also 
move freely among firms, looking for the one most likely to 
achieve a big liquidity event.  This flexibility for employers 
inevitably opens to the door to employer opportunism.  
Startups can terminate employees without cause after they 
have irrevocably made valuable contributions, thus reducing 
dilution of founders and investors but violating informal 
understandings they had with employees for fair 
compensation. 
Any steps to curtail the possibility of opportunism, 
unfortunately, must also involve reducing employer 
flexibility.  Whether the benefits of reducing opportunism 
exceed the costs of less employer flexibility is best sorted out 
by negotiation between talented potential employees and the 
startups that want to hire them.  In some cases, prospective 
employees may wish to negotiate buyout rights that protect 
them against opportunistic termination before a liquidity 
event.  This would make sense especially for prospective 
employees who expect to make valuable contributions to a 
startup’s value early in their term of employment, exposing 
them to holdup. 
Time will tell whether the Zynga clawback was an outlier 
event conceived by a hyperaggressive CEO or a harbinger of 
things to come in Silicon Valley.  Cultural norms can be 
delicate things, however, and what seem established 
understandings can quickly transform or dissipate, especially 
in dynamic industries.  Silicon Valley employment practices 
for most workers currently seem characterized by a great 
 
 182. Patricio Robles, Zynga Stomps on Silicon Valley Tradition: Report, 
ECONSULTANCY (Nov. 11, 2011, 3:17 PM), http://econsultancy.com/us/blog/8258-
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legal flexibility for employers, where informal norms 
regarding good employer behavior contain and regulate 
employment relationships.183  Venture capital firms as repeat 
players may play a crucial role in maintaining these norms.  
Individual entrepreneurs, if they are rich and powerful 
enough, may not be subject to these norms in the same way.  
If fair employment compensation norms in technology hubs 
do deteriorate (in the sense of permitting more opportunistic 
behavior by startup firms), legally enforceable contractual 
provisions constraining opportunism against employees may 
be expected—or hoped—to take their place. 
 
 183. Homa Bahrami, The Emerging Flexible Organization: Perspectives from 
Silicon Valley, 34 CAL. MGMT. REV., no.4, 1992 at 33, 35. 
